Multicollinearity in applied economics research and the Bayesian linear regression by EISENSTAT, Eric
 47 
 
MULTICOLLINEARITY IN APPLIED ECONOMICS RESEARCH AND 
THE BAYESIAN LINEAR REGRESSION 
 
Eric EISENSTAT 
 
Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, United States  
e-mail: eric.eisenstat@gmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
This article revises the popular issue of collinearity amongst explanatory 
variables in the context of a multiple linear regression analysis, particularly in 
empirical studies within social science related fields. Some important 
interpretations and explanations are highlighted from the econometrics 
literature with respect to the effects of multicollinearity on statistical inference, 
as well as the general shortcomings of the once fervent search for methods 
intended to detect and mitigate these effects. Consequently, it is argued and 
demonstrated through simulation how these views may be resolved against an 
alternative methodology by integrating a researcher’s subjective information in 
a formal and systematic way through a Bayesian approach. 
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1. Introduction 
Multicollinearity is the exotic term accorded by econometricians to denote 
strong linear relationships (e.g. collinearity) amongst explanatory variables in a 
multiple linear regression analysis. Indeed, multicollinearity and its effects on 
statistical inference are well explored topics in econometric literature (for an 
extensive overview and analysis see Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lütkepohl, & Lee, 1988, 
pp. 859-881). Why is collinearity in explanatory variables of such emphasized 
importance in econometrics? The fundamental problem for an economist engaged in 
an applied study, as for almost any other social science related statistical 
investigation for that matter, is that strong linear relationships amongst explanatory 
variables pose not only a formidable impedance on statistical inference regarding 
individual parameters, but a vastly elusive one at that; since economists rarely have 
direct control over the data generating process, they neither control the variation in 
explanatory variables, nor possess the option to obtain larger and/or different samples 
for their application. 
From a statistics perspective, the common view projects that collinearity 
undermines accurate inference through its effect on the standard errors of individual 
parameter estimates: ceteris paribus, stronger collinearity proportionately increases 
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standard errors, leads to wider confidence intervals, and lower test statistics (in 
absolute value) in significance tests.
1
 Accordingly, when an empirical study yields a 
particular regression parameter statistically insignificant (i.e. fails to reject the 
appropriate hypothesis test), there are two reasons why this occurs: (i) the true value 
of the parameter of interest is in fact zero, or (ii) the data sample is not informative 
enough to conclusively distinguish this parameter as statistically significantly 
different from zero. Since the latter is strongly related to the degree of collinearity in 
explanatory variables, a researcher particularly interested in demonstrating a 
statistically significant relationship may, therefore, be motivated not only to employ 
techniques intended to alleviate (ii), but also to search for a reasonable justification of 
rejecting (i) informally by arguing that the failure of the significance test is more 
attributable to (ii) through the presence of multicollinearity. 
Countless methods of “detecting” multicollinearity and containing its effects ex 
post have been proposed. In lieu of redesigning experiments that generate the data or 
obtaining larger samples (options which are most often simply not available to 
economists), the operational “solutions” in the literature almost exclusively focus on 
either the systematic inclusion/exclusion of certain explanatory variables, or the 
reconditioning of explanatory variables such as to induce orthogonality and yield 
lower degrees of collinearity according to some predetermined measure, depending 
on a particular case of interest. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that all such detection mechanisms and 
ex post data-manipulation solutions have almost unilaterally fallen victim to a 
criticism that consistently resounds a common theme – they are all invariably ad hoc. 
That is, there is no formal argumentative justification, neither from the perspective of 
probability theory nor classical statistics inference, for the general use of such 
proposed solutions. Simply put, colliniarity in explanatory variables is one feature 
(among several) of the data that is directly related to the amount of information 
provided by the sample. When the sample is not informative enough to lead to 
decisive conclusions, the only potential “solution” to this is to introduce more 
information, but if the new information does not manifest itself in the form of 
additional/different data, such information can only be subjective. Insofar as classical 
statistics inference outright rejects subjective information, however, it is not 
surprising that the search for operational solutions within this framework has failed 
to produce generally accepted techniques to combat multicollinearity: techniques 
incorporating subjective information within an objectivist paradigm are indeed ad 
hoc. 
The fundamental premise of the present paper is that there is in fact an 
appropriate place for subjective information in statistical inference. With this as a 
basis, it is argued that properly characterizing one’s subjective information and 
formally incorporating it into an empirical study is indeed an effective way to obtain 
conclusive statistical inference where the data alone may not offer definitive answers. 
                                                 
1
 This is, however, not generally true for linear combinations of parameters.  For an 
example where multicollinearity leads to increased power in a hypothesis test on a sum of 
regression parameters see Goldberger, 1991, pp. 250-251. 
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This is generally accomplished by formulating subjective information in terms of 
prior beliefs and employing Bayesian methods to systematically integrate the prior 
beliefs with the information available in the data. 
To support the proceeding argument, section 2 provides an overview of the 
multiple Classical Normal Regression (CNR) model with emphasis on the properties 
that are of particular interest to our discussion, as well as an in-depth, formal 
description of the effects of multicollinearity in this context. Accordingly, section 3 
introduces the Bayesian linear regression and concludes with a simulation example 
that demonstrates how multicollinearity may be handled from the Bayesian 
perspective in empirical applications within an economic study. 
 
2. Classical Normal Regression and Multicollinearity 
Recall that the multiple linear regression postulates a linear relationship 
between a dependent variable  and  explanatory variables  of the form 
 
 
(1
) 
where in accordance with the assumptions of the CNR model, . 
Without loss of generality, we designate  to be the parameter of interest and 
 and  to be the nuisance parameters. Moreover, we will denote the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators of , and  with , and , respectively. 
In what follows, it is convenient to express the estimators employing the 
following matrix notation: let  be the  vector consisting of dependent variables 
,  the  vector , and let  denote the  
matrix with elements  and  for  and 
. Furthermore, define , with  representing the  row of 
 and  denoting the element of  located at row  and column . Then, 
 
 
(2
) 
  
(3
) 
It is well known that  and  are stochastically independent and 
marginally follow the distributions 
  
(4
) 
  
(5
) 
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By letting  represent the coefficient of determination obtained from 
regressing  on all other explanatory variables , and  the sample variance 
of , we may write . From this expression, the conventional view on 
the effect of multicollinearity is immediately evident: as collinearty between  and 
other explanatory variables increases,  and for a fixed sample size 
. Thus, multicollinearity is typically related to imprecise estimates, 
which is in turn, reflected in wide confidence intervals as well as weak power in 
hypothesis tests on individual parameters. 
Because the computation of confidence intervals and individual test statistics 
related to the parameter  involve only the statistics , , and , it is evident that 
the epicentre of the multicollinearity effect lies in the variance of the individual 
parameter estimate under consideration. Yet the reason that a higher degree of 
collinearity in explanatory variables increases the variance of parameter estimates (or 
equivalently, the standard errors) is that larger collinearty means less variability in 
the sample, and hence, less information. Less informative data, in turn, naturally 
leads to more imprecise (or less certain) estimates. The central question, however, is 
how much collinearity is too much? 
To that end, it should be noted that the effect of collinearity on the variance of 
parameter estimates is significant only relative to the sample size. In fact, if the joint 
explanatory vector  is independent across observations , the effect (on the 
variance of an individual parameter estimate) of an increase in the sample size by 
one observation is equivalent to the effect of a decrease in the auxiliary coefficient of 
determination  by . Intuitively, both collinearity and sample size may 
be viewed as two very similar factors that determine the variability in the sample, 
which is the primary source of information offered by the data for statistical 
inference. Hence, the extent of either effect (high collinearity or low sample size) on 
individual parameter inference must be interpreted accordingly. 
A succinct and elegant interpretation of the severity of collinearity is best offered 
by the esteemed econometrician Arthur S. Goldberger (Goldberger, 1991, p. 252): 
To say that “standard errors are inflated by multicollinearity” is to suggest 
that they are artificially, or spuriously, large. But in fact they are appropriately 
large: the coefficient estimates actually would vary a lot from sample to sample. This 
may be regrettable but it is not spurious. 
Note that from a purely classical objectivist perspective that obstinately refutes 
all prior information in statistical inference, this claim is undisputable. That is, one 
certainly cannot commit inferential exclusivity to a set of data, and upon receiving 
vague inference from that data, dismiss this vagueness on the grounds that the data is 
“poorly conditioned.” Within the bonds of data exclusivity, one simply has no way of 
judging to what extent is a confidence interval “unreasonably” wide, since there 
exists no basis for comparison in succinctly defining “unreasonably.” Indeed, a larger 
degree of collinearity reduces the ability of the data to identify the statistical 
significance of individual parameters, as does a lower sample size, lower sum of 
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squared residuals in explanatory variables, etc., and without an ulterior source of 
information this data deficiency is incircumventable; different techniques of 
manipulating the data can only exploit more efficiently (or less efficiently) the 
variability already present, but will never induce more variability. 
On the other hand, it is entirely reasonable to gauge the degree to which 
“standard errors are inflated” by admitting prior information because the prior belief 
provides exactly the basis for comparison lacking in a purely objectivist paradigm. 
More specifically, one may justifiably claim that a confidence interval is “too wide” 
if it extends into regions where a priori the researcher assigns a low degree of 
probability in the sense that the information offered by the data regarding the 
parameter of interest contradicts the prior information. In addition, the extent of this 
“contradiction” may be sensibly measured when the prior information is formalized 
in a probabilistic manner. It is in this sense that prior information provides an 
additional instrument, which in the presence of collinearity provides the crucial 
supplement to variability lacking in the data. 
As a matter of fundamental principle, classical statistics inference offers little 
in terms of accommodation for subjective prior beliefs, and incorporating such 
beliefs in this paradigm, even when formulated probabilistically, is an awkward 
exercise at best. Bayesian methods, on the other hand, are well known to be the most 
efficient way of systematically combining prior information with the data in 
generating robust statistical inference (for introductory Bayesian texts, see (Koop, 
2003) and (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003)). To that end, we provide a simple 
demonstration of how prior information may be employed in alleviating adverse 
effects of collinearity within the Bayesian linear regression framework (Koop, 2003, 
pp. 15-85), (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003, pp. 351-385), (Poirier, 1995,              
pp. 524-580). 
 
3. Bayesian Linear Regression 
In concept, Bayesian inference differs fundamentally from classical inference 
in the following sense: the focus of Bayesian inference is on what the parameter is 
most likely to be, whereas the most common concern of classical inference is on what 
the parameter is definitely not. Nevertheless, there are strong practical parallels 
between the two approaches. For example, given a particular significance level  the 
 posterior probability interval (commonly constructed as the highest 
posterior density (HPD) interval) bears a close resemblance to the  
confidence interval for either individual parameters or a combination of parameters, 
while the mode of the posterior distribution is comparable to the parameter estimate 
generated by classical techniques. More importantly, as the sample size increases, 
both the posterior modes and posterior probability intervals converge to the 
corresponding Maximum Likelihood estimates and confidence intervals (Poirier, 
1995, pp. 306-307). 
Note that the latter fact reflects exactly the previously outlined intuition 
regarding the effect of collinearity relative to sample size. Insofar as the effect of 
collinearity is most apparent in smaller samples and diminishes proportionately as  
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increases, it is crucial that whatever instrument is adapted to offset the effects of 
collinearity in smaller samples reduces in relative importance as the sample size 
grows. Employing prior information through Bayesian techniques achieves just that: 
prior information is most influential on the posterior distribution, and hence most 
effective in combating collinearity, when  is small, while this influence is 
proportionately reduced as  increases and vanishes altogether as . 
We illustrate the Bayesian approach in this context through a simple simulation 
example based on some well-known results of the Bayesian linear regression. 
Accordingly, suppose the model of interest is 
 ,   
(6
) 
and the true parameter values are 
   
Using a pseudo-random number generator, we simulate three data samples of 
 for , , and , respectively, and compare the 
inference one would obtain under the Bayesian framework to that of the classical 
framework. Since our primary interest lies in the influence of collinearity on 
statistical inference, the simulated data is generated to yield a relatively high sample 
correlation between the explanatory variables while each pair  is sampled 
independently. Moreover, the experiment is designed such that the correlation 
between  and  emits a stronger effect on the precision of the estimates of  
relative to . Summary statistics of the simulated datasets are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Simulation Data Summary Statistics 
  
 
 
average 
standard 
deviation 
correlation 
   
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Now, consider how an econometrician might approach the task of estimating 
this model aware only of the descriptive properties of the data and operating under 
the assumption that the linear model is correctly specified as given in (6). Assume 
further that the econometrician is in possession of the smallest sample ( ) and 
is concerned that the strength of collinearity relative to this sample size may lead to 
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uninterestingly vague inference regarding her primary parameters of interest  and 
. On the other hand, her theoretical training endows her with some key intuition 
regarding the values of these parameters. She summarizes her beliefs as follows: 
1) centered at , ; 
2) symmetric (i.e.  is just as likely as , etc.); 
3) highly unlikely that  or . 
These beliefs may be formalized in terms of prior probability distributions 
regarding  and . Consequently, we shall proceed with a general form of the prior 
distribution given by 
 ,   
(7
) 
where  denotes the inverse gamma distribution (for example, see (Gelman, 
Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003, pp. 573-577)). It can be shown that the implied 
marginal distribution of  is 
 
 
(8
) 
where  student-t distribution with  degrees of freedom, and therefore, all three 
prior beliefs described above may be accommodated in (8) by appropriately setting 
the parameters  and . Specifically, let , , 
, where  denotes the cumulative distribution function 
(cdf) of the student-t distribution with  degrees of freedom This ensures that the 
modes of the distributions for  and  are  and , respectively, while 
, where  may be set to any reasonably small value, 
(e.g. the ensuing results are based on ). The symmetry condition is, of 
course, automatically satisfied since the student-t distribution is naturally symmetric. 
Note that Bayesian methods require that prior distributions be properly 
specified for all parameters. Since, the researcher is neither particularly interested in 
 and , nor does she posses very specific beliefs regarding their values, she may 
specify , , , and  in such way that results in mildly-informative prior 
distributions for  and . Such mild beliefs, for example, are sufficiently 
represented with the following values: , , , . 
The essence of Bayesian inference is the focus on updating one’s prior belief 
by the observed data sample. This, in turn, requires the construction of the likelihood 
function, which is operationally expressed as the distribution of the dependent 
variable conditional on the parameters: 
  
(9
) 
where  denotes the  identity matrix. Using (7) and (9), the joint posterior 
distribution is obtained through Bayes’ Rule as 
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(1
0) 
and contains all information necessary to carry out statistical inference on the 
parameters. While exact analytic expressions for posterior distributions are, in 
general, intractable (most often, posterior inference is based on simulating from the 
posterior distribution), the Bayesian linear regression model yields fairly simple and 
practically straightforward posteriors. 
Consequently, define the following notation: let , 
 (i.e. a  diagonal matrix), and 
  
(1
1) 
  
  
  
The joint posterior distribution of all model parameters in our case is then 
given by 
 ,   
(1
2) 
whereas the marginal posterior distributions of interest are obtained as 
 
 
(1
3) 
The marginal posterior distributions for each of the three cases (of varying 
sample size) under examination are plotted along with the corresponding prior 
distributions for the parameters  and  in Figure 1, Panels (A) and (B), 
respectively. More specifically, Panel (A) illustrates the evolution of the posterior 
distribution of  from the prior as the sample size grows while Panel (B) depicts the 
analogous phenomenon for . The intuition regarding the influence of prior 
information on posterior inference as  increases is immediately evident. In both 
cases, with each increasing sample size, the posterior distribution collapses around 
the mode, which in turn, converges to the true parameter value.  
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Panel (A):  Panel (B):  
Fig. 1. Prior and posterior distributions for  and  
Observe, however, that the collapsing effect is distinctly slower for  in 
comparison to . This is precisely a reflection of the influence of collinearity, which 
is by design more influential in the posterior distribution of than that of . In fact, 
a closer examination of Panel (A) reveals that the posterior of  for  is not 
noticeably less dispersed relative to its prior distribution, but rather only exhibits a 
shift in location towards the true value. A more illuminating interpretation of the 
latter may be formulated as follows: the posterior distribution of  at  
reflects a joint effort on the part of the prior information and the data whereby the 
information from the data is incorporated into more accurately centering the posterior 
while the prior maintains the dispersion contained by substituting for the lack of 
certainty projected by highly collinear data with a priori information. As a result, 
even with a relatively low sample size (i.e. relative to the degree of correlation in the 
explanatory variables), posterior inference regarding  is sufficiently informative. 
The important trade-off is, of course, that this gain in precision at  is 
strongly reliant on the prior beliefs, and hence, accentuates the importance of 
introducing prior information cautiously and in a manner that is convincingly 
justifiable. On the other hand, as the sample size grows and the information projected 
by the data gains in vigor, the need for the prior to contain the posterior precision 
diminishes and its role in determining the shape of the posterior distribution is 
marginalized. This is clearly reflected in Panel (A), by the progressive reduction of 
the posterior dispersion at  and  where the abundance of available 
observations overcomes the small sample deficiencies resulting from collinearity. 
Table 2 and Table 3 further reinforce this intuition in a numerical comparison of 
Bayesian and classical inference that would be conventionally employed in interpreting 
the results for each of the three sample size levels. A quick overview of Table 3, which 
summarizes typical classical quantities of interest, reveals the diminishing effect of 
collinearity in increasing : for both parameters  and , as  increases regression 
estimates converge to the true values, standard errors decrease, confidence intervals 
shrink, and significance test statistics grow (in absolute value). Additionally, this 
phenomenon is accelerated for quantities related to , in evident parallel with the 
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influence of prior information on posterior distributions, and is likewise explained by 
the more prominent influence of collinearity on the precision of  estimates. 
In this sense, the fact that the analogous posterior quantities detailed in Table 2 
converge to their classical counterparts is unsurprising. In fact, at  the 
posterior modes of  and  (which for the student-t distribution are equivalent to 
the respective posterior means and medians) are nearly identical to the OLS estimates 
 and , respectively. Similarly, posterior standard deviations are approximately 
equivalent to the standard errors, as are the  posterior probability intervals to the 
 confidence intervals. 
Where the posterior inference differs most significantly from classical 
inference, however, is in terms of the parameter  for . Here, it is 
worthwhile to note that the  classical confidence interval extends over negative 
values of . Indeed, the limited sample is not informative enough to identify  as 
statistically significantly different from zero at the  significance level in the 
classical context (this is equivalently verified by the corresponding significance test 
failing to reject the null hypothesis  against ). On the Bayesian 
side, Table 2 illustrates that with a sample of  observations, the lower bound 
of the  posterior probability interval is notably greater than the hypothesized 
null value . In an analogous statement of significance, therefore, our Bayesian 
inference allows us to confidently proclaim  as statistically significantly different 
from zero, given our prior beliefs.
2
 
 
Table 2 
Bayesian/Posterior Inference 
  
mean / 
median / 
mode 
standard 
deviation 
 Probability Interval (HPD) zero 
outside 
interval 
lower bound upper bound 
 
     yes 
     yes 
     yes 
 
     yes 
     yes 
     yes 
 
                                                 
2
 In fact, the Bayesian paradigm defines a formal methodology of Bayesian 
Hypothesis Testing which is based on Bayesian Posterior Odds and is generally unrelated in 
terms of inference to the HPD interval approach demonstrated here; for more details see 
(Poirier, 1995, pp. 376-392, 540-551).  However, the technical and conceptual complexities 
involved in a satisfactory discussion of posterior odds are beyond the scope of our purpose.  
We only mention here that in the simplified setting of our example, and particularly insofar 
as our focus is on comparing posterior inference to classical inference, the HPD interval 
approach is sufficiently appropriate. 
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Table 3 
Classical/Frequentist Inference 
  estimate standard 
deviation 
 Confidence 
Interval 
significance test 
 significantly 
different 
from zero 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
       
no 
      yes 
      
yes 
       
yes 
      yes 
      
yes 
4. Conclusion 
The simulation example of the previous section serves to illustrate a simple 
case where incorporating subjective information through Bayesian methods yields a 
more conclusive statistical inference relative to its strictly objective, classical 
counterpart. This should be by no means misinterpreted as suggesting that subjective 
beliefs offer a general solution to the multicollinearity problem. A better way to 
perceive the role of subjective information in a particular application is to ask the 
question what kind of prior belief(s) would yield the affirmative results sought by the 
researcher? If such beliefs are justifiable through theoretical considerations related to 
the subject of interest, then Bayesian inference may offer convincing support for 
definitive empirical claims that cannot be asserted by objective inference alone, be it 
due to multicollinearity or other data sample related deficiencies. If the said beliefs, 
on the other hand, cannot be justified on a theoretical basis, conclusions drawn based 
on ad hoc claims will once again be subject to doubt and inevitable rejection.  
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